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Resource Allocation in the CGIAR - 
Does the Balancing Donor Concept Need Adiustine? 
To reconcile its donors’ autonomous funding decisions with the System’s collectively 
approved strategies and priorities, the CGIAR deploys a balancing facility which allots funds to 
centers to the extent they do not receive full funding for their approved core programs. Since 
the inception of the CGIAR, the balancing facility has been provided by the World Bank which 
makes its contribution available for this purpose without restrictions. 
The balancing facility has served the CGIAR well by stabilizing the resource flows to the 
centers. In the past, in conditions of sufficient overall funding, the facility was able to fill 
funding gaps at individual centers, and thus allow the CGIAR to work as an integrated system. 
However, with funding stagnating or in decline, a larger number of sponsored centers and 
growing demand on center research, it has become increasingly difficult, or even impossible, 
to fill gaps. More importantly, however, by still attempting to do so, the facility may have 
discouraged resource mobilization efforts by individual centers, and contributed to the worsening 
resource malaise. Disincentives to fund-raising, latent when funding was plentiful, are 
increasingly felt as the System comes under financial stress. One of the undesirable 
consequences could be that in the current year the CGIAR will be unable to draw the full amount 
of the World Bank’s contribution because of insufficient matching contributions from other 
donors. 
To reduce the disincentives for fund-raising by individual centers, the paper recommends 
broadening the scope of interventions by the facility. After exploring various options the 
conclusion is that there appears to be a need for maintaining some contingency to fill funding 
gaps of individual centers and stabilizing resource flows in the short run. After meeting this 
need, the bulk of the resources could be distributed in two possible ways. The facility could 
apply its funds to match centers’ successful efforts in raising core-funding in order to set a 
positive incentive to mobilize resources. Alternatively, the facility could continue to support the 
strategies and priorities endorsed by the Group but act as a “donor of first resort” instead of 
“donor of last resort” and provide a percentage of CGIAR approved requirements to all centers. 
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Stem Next 
The Finance Committee is requested to consider the proposal to overhaul the current 
operation of the balancing facility. Earlier drafts of this paper have been shared with the Center 
Directors’ Public Awareness and Resources Committee. The Center Directors as a group are 
likely to consider the proposals at their forthcoming meeting in October 1993 and advise the 
Finance Committee of their views. 
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Resource Allocation in the CGIAR - 
Does the Balancing Donor Concept Need Adjusting? 
I. Introduction 
1. The CGIAR supports its international research centers because coordinated and sustained 
agricultural research, undertaken internationally, will produce new production technologies, 
better policies and increased research capabilities which, in turn, will result in more, and more 
equitably distributed food for the developing world. To this end, the Group sets itself a common 
research strategy and priorities, and makes funding available for research that falls within these 
priorities. 
2. The CGIAR could accomplish its purpose by pooling resources and distributing them 
among its centers and research activities through a centralized allocation mechanism. It has 
chosen not to do this, and instead has opted for a decentralized mode, which leaves both donors 
and centers maximum discretion: it is the prerogative of each individual donor to select centers 
and activities they want to support, while centers develop their research proposals and offer them 
for funding. 
3. If the System worked like a stock or commodities exchange, with donors bidding for 
center programs they want to support, it would clear the market, and each center would find 
funding for all its research proposals. While in several respects the System resembles a market 
place, it is an imperfect one, with donors only morally committed to contribute funds to the 
System, and no pricing mechanism that would allow donors to bid according to expectations of 
returns or benefits they hope to derive from supporting one center and not supporting another. 
4. To reconcile its donors’ autonomous funding decisions with the System’s collectively 
approved strategies and priorities, the System deploys a balancing mechanism (or balancing 
facility as it will be referred to in this paper) which allots funds to centers to the extent they do 
not receive full funding from other donors for their approved programs. Since the inception of 
the CGIAR, the balancing facility has been provided by the World Bank which makes its 
contribution available for this purpose. Because it provides funding where others don’t, the 
Bank is frequently referred to as the System’s “donor of last resort”. 
5. The balancing facility has served the CGIAR well as long as financial support for the 
CGIAR was strong and its funding on the increase. In conditions of sufficient overall funding, 
the facility was able to fill funding gaps at individual centers, and thus allow the CGIAR to work 
as an integrated system. However, with funding stagnating or in decline, a larger number of 
centers sponsored, and demand on center research growing, it becomes increasingly difficult, 
or even impossible, to fill gaps. More importantly, however, by still attempting to do so, the 
facility may have discouraged resource mobilization efforts by individual centers, and 
contributed to the worsening resource malaise. Disincentives to fund-raising, latent when 
funding was less constrained, are increasingly felt as the System comes under financial stress. 
One of the undesirable consequences could be that in the current year the CGIAR will be unable 
to draw the full amount of the World Bank’s contribution because of insufficient matching 
contributions from other donors. 
6. The paper discusses the key principles under which the CGIAR currently operates 
(Section II), and describes the ways in which activities are programmed, resources allocated, and 
how both are reconciled (Section III). It then reviews incentives and disincentives for centers to 
mobilize resources as they are inherent to the balancing facility as it now operates (Section IV). 
7. In order to strengthen incentives for fund-raising by individual centers, the paper 
recommends in its Section V to broaden the scope of interventions by the facility. Various 
options are explored, and summarized in tabular form in Annex I. There appears to be a need 
for maintaining some contingency to fill funding gaps of individual centers and to stabilize 
resource flows in the short run. For the remainder, the facility could apply part of its funds to 
match centers’ successful efforts in raising core-funding in order to set a positive incentive to 
mobilize resources. Alternatively, the facility could support programs in accordance with the 
strategies and priorities endorsed by the Group by providing a fixed percentage of CGIAR 
approved center requirements as a “donor of first resort”, providing funds to all centers in 
advance of commitments by other donors. A combination of gap-filling and up-front distribution 
(first-donor option) may be the most appropriate use of the facility in the current overall funding 
situation of the CGIAR. 
II. Donor Autonomy, Center Independence, And A Common Research Agenda 
8. As an informal association, the CGIAR brings together donors concerned with raising 
agricultural productivity in developing countries under sustainable conditions, and international 
research centers whose mandate it is to develop new technologies, policies and research 
capabilities to enhance agricultural production and productivity in those countries. The CGIAR 
is open to any government, agency or organization, public or private, that is willing to support 
its goals financially on a sustained basis. There are no legal or formal arrangements governing 
membership or burden-sharing among donors. The CGIAR operates on the basis of three key 
principles: (i) as a group it decides on a common strategy and a set of research priorities; (ii) 
the international research centers, as legally independent entities, develop and present their 
research proposals in accordance with the Group’s overall strategy and priorities; (iii) the donors 
then fund directly, and independently from each other, research activities of individual centers 
of their choice, according to their foreign aid policies and priorities, 
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9. By limiting itself to setting a common strategic agenda, while leaving its funding and 
implementation to donor members and centers, the CGIAR would seem to have made an 
ingenious choice. Separating individual funding responsibilities from group decisions such as 
the choice of centers to be sponsored by the CGIAR, and research priorities to be supported, 
has greatly enhanced the Group’s capacity to reach consensus, that in more structured 
organizations would require intricate and long negotiations. It also has allowed donors, 
individually or collectively, to draw advice from sources of their choice, be it the scientific 
community, the CGIAR Technical Advisory Committee, or the CGIAR Centers. It also has 
enabled the Group to function with minimal organizational infrastructure, mainly needed for 
monitoring the judicious allocation of funds among centers and their responsible use. 
Setting the Common Agenda 
10. As a group, the CGIAR has a dynamic, multi-year strategy and set of priorities, which 
it endorses upon recommendations from TAC. The Group’s collective endorsement of the 
strategy and priorities does not constitute a binding commitment for individual donor members. 
It is, however, a relevant framework against which members can make their own program 
choices and resource allocations. For the centers, the CGIAR strategy and priorities provide the 
guideposts for formulating their program proposals, knowing that the degree of adherence of 
their proposals to the strategy and priorities enhances their acceptability to the CGIAR. 
Donor Autonomy 
11. Donor funds are not centrally pooled: each donor contributes to centers of its choice, and 
in the amount it wishes. This gives donors a measure of control over the use of funds; they can 
choose research activities consistent with their own developmental objectives and select the 
centers which in their perception contribute most effectively to their own policies and strategies. 
A close donor-center relation has become increasingly important as pressures on donor agencies 
grow to account for the use of taxpayers’ funds. The high degree of donor discretion in 
allocating funds to individual centers and center programs may explain why CGIAR programs 
still received strong donor support after aid fatigue began to slow aid flows in the mid-eighties. 
Center Independence 
12. The centers formulate their research proposals and estimate their funding requirements. 
These are reviewed by TAC, consolidated and then presented to the CGIAR for approval. The 
aggregation of all center programs as endorsed by TAC and approved by the Group becomes 
the System’s core program. Details on the planning and budgeting cycles are in para. 21. 
. 
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13. Centers are free to suggest, and donors free to fund, center activities that build on the 
approved core program, have a high priority, but may not be international or strategic in nature, 
either because they are targeted at individual countries or have limited developmental goals, and 
therefore go beyond a center’s primary mission. Such “complementary” programs offer a way 
for centers to augment their resources. 
14. It is the primary responsibility of the individual centers to appeal for donor funding. This 
creates a competitive environment for center resource mobilization. Invariably, some centers 
will be seen by some donors as contributing more effectively than others to their own strategic 
concerns, and will be more successful in meeting their funding goals. Others who do not will 
depend more heavily on the balancing facility. 
The Need For A Balancing Facility 
15. The three mentioned principles - donor autonomy, center independence, and a common 
research agenda - will work in consonance only if the supply of funds matches the centers’ 
demand, and donor preferences mirror center needs. With the degree of funding discretion the 
System leaves to donors, this is unlikely to happen. Despite the overall consensus established 
on strategies and priorities, some funding needs will always remain unmet. 
16. Center independence and donor autonomy will thus not permit a coherent set of strategies 
and priorities to be implemented unless a “balancing facility” underwrites approved programs 
as a whole and meets requirements of individual centers’ programs which remain unfunded after 
all donors have made their allocations to individual centers. 
17. Since the inception of the CGIAR, the World Bank has provided this balancing facility 
by allowing its entire contribution to the CGIAR to be allocated in accordance with the priorities 
collectively approved by the CGIAR. World Bank funds are provided without restrictions as to 
their application to activities or to types of expenditure. Also, the World Bank has traditionally 
guaranteed to provide a set percentage -first 10, now 15 percent- of the System’s total core 
funding needs. While critical to the overall operation of the system, this policy has allowed the 
Bank to leverage total funding and, at the same time, to support long term or new initiatives 
which may not, or not yet, be attractive to other donors. The contribution is managed and 
allocated on behalf of the World Bank by the CGIAR Secretariat. 
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111. Programming And Resource Allocation 
18. A system that leaves as much autonomy as the CGIAR allows its donors and centers, 
invariably operates under a high degree of uncertainty. This is reflected in its programming and 
resource allocation procedures which are described in the following paragraphs. 
19. Traditionally, the CGIAR has used a two-tier programming and resource allocation 
process: procedures applying to programs and activities endorsed by the CGIAR and 
constituting the “core” of the system and center programs, differ from those that apply to 
activities that are not part of, but complement, these core activities. These latter activities, 
mostly project based activities, allow centers to pursue new research opportunities and to 
mobilize funding outside traditional CGIAR allocation channels. 
The Core Program and Its Funding 
20. The core program includes a center’s basic activities, i.e. activities that are considered 
vital to accomplishing its mission. In addition to actual research and research-related activities 
(such as training, information and communication services), the core program includes operation 
and maintenance of the physical plant and infrastructure, and the managerial and administrative 
services necessary for the efficient operation of a research organization. 
21. Programming the core funding requirements involves the centers, TAC, the CGIAR 
Secretariat and the donors in a complex iterative process. Periodically (i.e., every five to ten 
years), the Centers prepare strategic plans in which the needs of center clients (their diverse 
partners in developing countries) as well as CGIAR strategies and priorities are reflected. 
Center strategies are presented for information to TAC and the CGIAR. In a next step, Centers 
prepare five year programs and budgets which translate their strategies into operational 
proposals, and constitute, in the aggregate, the medium-term program of the CGIAR; centers’ 
five year plans are reviewed by TAC to ensure their consistency with system strategies and 
priorities. Subsequently, TAC submits a set of recommendations to the CGIAR which endorses 
it after review and discussion. Finally, centers prepare annual work programs and budgets 
which are reviewed by TAC for consistency with the approved five-year program, and for 
progress made towards achieving the system’s medium-term strategies and priorities. Once 
approved by the CGIAR, the annual programs and budgets become the basis for the yearly 
allocation of funds by donors. 
22. The actual allocation of funds to centers is the prerogative and responsibility of donors 
who allocate them to centers in accordance with their own policies and preferences. Normally, 
they “pledge” their contributions at ICW for the coming year. 
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23. Before and at ICW, the CGIAR secretariat attempts to relate pledges to aggregate 
demand, and informs the group and the centers of the outcome. Subsequently, it monitors 
funding as it becomes available, both at the aggregate level, and to individual centers. As other 
donors confirm their core contribution and allocate it to centers, the World Bank’s contribution 
is applied by the Secretariat to balance the funding for the core programs. This is done based 
on a formula (see para. 32 below) and in several installments, as information on donor 
allocations becomes available. Allocations may have to be reversed if a donor makes a 
preViOUSly UMMOUnCed allocation t0 a Center. 
24. While donor pledges made at ICW are translated to funding decisions only over the 
course of the year, centers must decide at the beginning of the year, if not before, which 
programs to carry out and to what extent, with necessarily incomplete knowledge of the source 
and level of funding they will eventually receive. As funding pledges materialize centers need 
to continually adjust their operating programs to match donor commitments. Such adjustments 
are made difficult by the fact that part of core funds are restricted and can only be used for 
specified programs and activities. 
25. Because it provides a secure back-up source of unrestricted funding, the balancing facility 
substantially aids center financial management. 
Complementary Programs and Their Funding 
26. In contrast to core programs, complementary programs are agreed between a donor and 
a center, outside the conceptual and procedural framework of the CGIAR. They are subject to 
only limited oversight from TAC which sees to it that they do not conflict with the objectives 
of core programs. Complementary activities are always financed outside the core program and 
the balancing facility. 
Has the Two-Tiers System Outlived its Usefulness? 
27. In the early years of the CGIAR, types of funding coincided broadly with the types of 
programs: core funding supported core programs, while complementary programs were financed 
from other than core funds, In recent years, however, the distinction has become blurred. As 
demand for center products and services grew, while core funding did not increase in step, new 
initiatives -even when they were clearly of a core program nature- were launched as special 
projects; for instance, most of the capital cost of the ICRISAT Sahelian Center was financed 
from non-core funds, as was IITA’s biological control program. In some instances, funding 
agencies made it a condition that their contributions not be treated as core funding, out of 
concern that this would imply a commitment for continued support beyond the initially budgeted 
stage. In other cases, non-core funding has led to the creation of core programs, as activities 
originally conceived as complementary broadened into mainstream activities of a center. 
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2a. What determines the nature of a contribution as “core” or “complementary” has thus 
become a matter of case law. It is now accepted that core activities can be funded from non- 
core funds. The CGIAR Secretariat currently reports as “core” all support of core programs, 
irrespective of whether they are provided as core-contributions or not. 
29. Despite its apparent shortcomings, the CGIAR’s two-tier system deserves to be 
maintained: it is the core program that allows collective decision making on goals and priorities, 
its monitoring and reviews, and thus forms the essence of the System. Allowing only one 
funding category to include all activities would not strengthen System cohesion. Because 
agreement by the Group would be required for every activity undertaken by a center, this would 
likely prevent the System from reaching agreement, or at best lead it to agree on the smallest 
common denominator. Put more pointedly, the fact that non-core activities are permitted and 
legitimate, allows the Group to act collectively. Preventing donors from funding activities 
outside approved core activities may prevent new research initiatives from being tried, very 
probably lead donors to seek investment opportunities outside the CGIAR, and thus close access 
to additional funding sources. 
30. However, adjustments to the two-tiers system seem warranted, particularly in the way 
the balancing facility is operated, in order to minimize undesirable effects on resource allocation 
and mobilization. These will be examined in the following Section. 
IV. The Balancing Facility 
31. The balancing facility is operated in a mechanistic way; no value judgment or discretion 
enters into this process. Its resources are allocated among centers as a function of the difference 
between their approved core requirements and the funds made available by donors other than the 
World Bank. The objective is twofold: to bring core funding of all centers as close as possible 
to the CGIAR approved level of core funding requirements, i.e. gap-filling, and to assure stable 
resource flows in an environment of floating exchange rates. Since the actual amounts of donor 
contributions and their dollar equivalents are not known until late in the CGIAR’s financial year, 
the exact amount payable by the balancing facility to individual centers normally cannot be 
determined until the last quarter of the year. 
32. The Bank’s contribution to any single center is limited to 25% of a center’s approved 
core funding. After a center has reached it for three consecutive years, this maximum is 
reduced, in three equal steps to 15 percent over the subsequent three years. The purpose is to 
prevent a center from becoming too dependent on funding from the facility, soften the 
“distortion” of funding preferences expressed by donors, and provide an incentive to renew 
efforts at mobilizing funds from other sources. 
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33. Without a balancing facility which reconciles collectively approved funding requirements 
with actual funding made available by individual donors, the CGIAR could not operate as a 
cohesive, policy based research facilitator. In fact, if the balancing facility were to be 
discontinued, the CGIAR would turn into a loose association in which donors and centers would 
pursue their own interests with scant attention to common goals and strategies; it would no 
longer be a cohesive system. The question, therefore, is not whether the system could survive 
without a balancing facility, but rather whether the way the facility currently operates can be 
improved in order to correct some of the shortcomings identified below. 
Advantages of the Current Modus Operandi 
34. The current operating mode of the balancing facility has served the System well. Its 
provision has allowed centers to commit funds to research programs in the absence of firm donor 
commitments and thus permitted the orderly conduct of business. It has also provided some 
protection against unforeseeable events for which a center normally does not make provisions 
in its budget: e.g. it has compensated centers for exchange rate fluctuations that intervene 
between the time a donor pledges funds and disburses them. From time to time, it has also 
compensated centers (through a special stabilizing mechanism) for adverse movements in local 
purchasing power where they could be documented on the basis of reliable data. Thus, it has 
helped to stabilize the financial environment in which centers operate. 
Drawbacks of the Current Modus Operandi 
35. However, with core funding declining in both absolute and relative terms, the balancing 
facility as currently operated gives centers a false sense of security. It may also discourage 
centers that depend on the facility for an important share of their funding needs, from seeking 
alternative funding sources. These and other concerns will be explored in the following 
paragraphs. 
36. The facilitv reduces the incentive for centers to mobilize additional core resources. If 
the sum of donor funding commitments to a center core program falls short of requirements, the 
facility will automatically provide the balance, if not for the totality, at least in part. For the 
center concerned there is thus little or no reason to try to mobilize resources to fill the gap. In 
fact, the facility can have the opposite effect: if a center succeeds in mobilizing additional core 
resources to fill its funding gap, its “entitlement” against the facility is reduced correspondingly, 
resulting in a zero-sum game for the center. By contrast, if a donor offers funding for a 
program or activity which is mutually defined as complementary -though it may be of a core 
nature- funding of such activity is additional to the center’s total funding. From its narrower 
perspective, a center gains by transferring activities out of its core program to the 
complementary program; and donors may be willing to support such practices if the underlying 
activities are consistent with their own priorities which are not necessarily identical to those of 
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the system. It should be noted, however, that the system as a whole loses from this practice 
since the World Bank currently matches its contribution only against core funding, and not 
against funding provided for complementary activities. 
37. The facilitv allows the CGIAR to defer hard decisions on whether to discontinue 
unuonular and ineffective nrograms. Because the CGIAR allows donors to allocate their funds 
to centers and programs of their choice, and not necessarily in line with the collectively 
approved program, there will be discrepancies between approved center funding requirements 
and funds made available to them. For legitimate reasons, a donor can decline to allocate funds 
to a core program, e.g. because of procedural restrictions internal to the donor, or 
incompatibility of a core program with a donor’s short term priorities. However, if donors 
generally withhold support for a center or program, this is likely to signal a more serious 
problem, i.e. a basic discrepancy between a center’s aspirations and donor preferences. l’ This 
has permitted donors to collectively approve an unattractive or ineffective center program, while 
individually denying it their support and leaving it to the charge of the balancing facility, rather 
than deciding collectively to discontinue such program. 
38. Allocations by the facilitv may be nerceived bv donors as frustrating their own funding 
intentions. Assume a donor wishes to influence the overall thrust of a center’s research 
program, and to that effect re-allocates restricted core resources from existing towards a new 
set of center activities. Since the balancing facility will support the center’s unfunded activities, 
such support is likely to be viewed by that donor as foiling its efforts at re-directing center 
activities, thus depriving the donor of a sense of ownership and leverage. 
39. The balancing facilitv tends to strain donor solidaritv. For the CGIAR to function 
effectively as a system requires that donors contribute to the core program they collectively 
approved. If a donor fails to comply with this implicit understanding and primarily funds 
complementary programs, this will be offset, at least in part, by the balancing facility. Yet, 
donors who live up to the understanding and provide their share of support to core activities, 
may feel shortchanged by such practice. In their view, a donor who supports primarily 
complementary activities enjoys preferential treatment, operates outside the CGIAR framework, 
reaps the benefits of the System without bearing the cost, and, in short, receives a free ride. 
The balancing facility is seen as contributing to this. 
Changing The Modus Operandi 
40. All this suggests a need for adjusting the way in which the balancing facility is presently 
operated. However, before reviewing alternative options it is useful to define the criteria by 
which a preferred option could be selected. Six such criteria, which a modified allocation 
l! The longer such a discrepancy persists, the more important a factor the balancing facility becomes among a 
center’s financial planning parameters; and, eventually, seeking additional funding for complementary activities becomes 
the only avenue for short term growth. 
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formula should meet in order to buttress the System’s financial health and efficiency, and several 
options are presented in tabular form in Annex I, and reviewed in more detail below. 
Criteria for a Modified Allocation Formula 
41. Criterion # 1: The balancing facility should support the integrity of the CGIAR as a 
System by allowing the implementation of its collectively taken decisions, embodied in its 
strategies, priorities and center action plans. It should apply its funds to collectively approved 
core activities. 
42. Criterion # 2: The balancing facility should endeavor to stabilize the flow of core 
funding by shielding centers from exogenous short-term effects for which they cannot make 
budgetary provisions, particularly sudden and unpredicted fluctuations in exchange rates, and 
losses in purchasing power in the host country. 
43. Criterion # 3: To a reasonable extent, the facility should also protect the centers from 
endogenous factors, such as abrupt changes in donor allocations or the level of their 
contributions. Such changes are often driven by short-term considerations not compatible with 
the long-term nature of center research, e.g. a donor’s desire for quick product delivery; a 
dislike for basic research, and for centers or center programs in their formative stages when 
results and returns cannot be assessed. 
44. Criterion # 4: The facility ought to reward, or at least not penalize, centers which 
succeed in mobilizing additional core funds. This criterion needs to be qualified in two respects: 
First, an allocation formula which applied all or most of the funds in the facility for this purpose 
is likely to challenge and distort the System’s integrity (criterion # 1). Second, such formula 
may not be easy to administer as it may be difficult in specific cases to determine the 
additionality of funds. If, for instance, a donor re-allocates core resources from one center to 
another, this should not trigger a reward from the facility for the beneficiary center. 
45. Criterion # 5: The facility should continue to allow donors to directly influence center 
programs through their funding allocations. A close donor-center relationship imparts a sense 
of ownership important for a donors internal mobilization efforts. 
46. Criterion # 6: The facility should be operated in a clear and transparent fashion, and on 
the basis of reliable, and generally available data. Recipient centers should be able to anticipate 
the outcome with a reasonable degree of accuracy. For instance, while exchange rate 
fluctuations can easily documented on the basis of IMF statistics, variations in dollar purchasing 
power in a host country which are not reflected in the exchange rate, can often not be 
documented. On these grounds, the facility should continue compensating for exchange rate 
fluctuations but normally not for losses of purchasing power not reflected in a host country’s 
exchange rate (see para. 34 above). 
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47. Options to remedy some of the drawbacks of the current modus operandi basically fall 
into two broad categories: those which adjust the current allocation formula; and those which 
overhaul its operating procedures to better meet the criteria described above. 
(1) Modifying the Current Allocation Formula 
48. Under the current formula (para. 32 above) the facility funds up to 25 percent of the 
approved core program of a center; and under the tapering provision, if shortfalls remain at a 
high level, i.e. above 20 percent of the approved core program for more than three years, the 
balancing contribution is phased down to 15 percent over following three years. 
49. This phasing-down will not correct the undesirable incentive to inflate complementary 
programs at the expense of core programs (para. 36 above). Because of the uncertainty over 
the amount eventually available from the facility, it also places a heavy burden on the centers’ 
budget management and monitoring needs. And it delays the decision to deal with poor 
performers (para. 37 above). 
50. Some of these drawbacks could be addressed with a “Fast Cutback Formula” which 
would, for instance, eliminate the three-year grace period, lower the maximum for which 
balancing is provided to, say, 10 percent of the approved program, and progressively penalize 
shortfalls above 10 percent (see example given in Annex II). Or a “Graduated Cutback 
Formula” could be considered which would result in less draconian reductions of funding from 
the facility. Unlike the “Fast Cutback Formula”, it would apply the higher penalties only to the 
incremental shortfall. For a comparison of the effects of both formulas see Annex II. 
51. Such formulas could be further tightened through sunset provisions which would require 
the CGIAR to rule on the fate of a center with insufficient donor support. For instance, if a 
center has mobilized less than 70% percent of its approved program for three consecutive years, 
donors would decide on whether the center should be dissolved or merged. 
52. While such modifications will strengthen the incentive for centers to secure a higher share 
than the current 75 percent of core funding, centers with sufficient core funding will still want 
to maximize complementary funding because of its additional@. But more importantly, such 
modifications would severely limit the capacity of the facility to tide over a center during 
temporary funding shortages, and would increase the uncertainty with regard to a center’s annual 
funding situation. 
(2) Widening the Scope of Interventions of the Balancing Facility 
53. Currently the balancing facility can only intervene by filling gaps in the approved core 
program of a center that remains unfunded. It does so by mechanically applying the described 
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formula. No discretionary judgment enters into the process. It may be more effective to allow 
the facility to use its funds, or at least some of its funds, on a matching basis, or as up-front 
support to be provided in accordance with the System’s agreed priorities. 
Matching 
54. Using the balancing facility to match core-funding pledges a center has received would 
set a strong incentive for centers to mobilize core funds. If the entire 15 percent World Bank 
contribution were to be used for this purpose, a center would receive, for instance, 17.65 cents 
for every dollar of core resources mobilized. 
55. A matching formula would be desirable for the following reasons: Because there would 
no longer be a funding guaranty for unfunded core expenses, it would discourage centers from 
seeking special projects financing in order not to lose their access to the facility; it would also 
encourage centers who previously neglected their fund raising needs on the expectation of their 
secure access to the balancing facility. Of course, if the World Bank contribution were to be 
used in its entirety for matching, this would deprive the System of the balancing feature, and 
with it of the capacity to function as an integrated funding entity. One would also have to be 
concerned that centers more favored with donor support, and more successful in their fund- 
raising efforts, may run up substantial surpluses in excess of their approved core funding 
requirements. Conceivably, such surpluses could be retained in the System for short-term 
bridging assistance to less fortunate centers, while a surplus center would receive a credit which 
it could use in years of need. The practical implications of administering such credit system 
would, however, seem to outweigh its possible benefits. 
Up-front Support (“First-Donor Support”) 
56. Another possibility would be to apply the World Bank contribution in support of System 
priorities, thus giving the Bank the status of “first donor” rather than of “donor-of-last-resort”. 
The World Bank contribution would then be allocated strictly in line with agreed priorities by 
applying a certain percentage to each approved core program. Assuming the entire World Bank 
contribution would be applied in this way, this would provide up to 15 cents for each dollar of 
approved core requirements. 
57. This formula would present advantages: (a) by funding each component of the collectively 
agreed System priorities, it provides the effective support to the System; and (b) centers could 
count on these funds with certainty regarding the amount available from the facility. However, 
such a formula does not take into account the actual funding situation of each center and 
therefore can lead to over-funding as well as critical underfunding, leading ultimately to 
distortions of the collective decisions. 
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Combination Formulas 
58. While all three types of intervention (the present gap-filling, matching, and up-front 
payments), if applied alone, would seem to have their drawbacks, there are options worth 
exploring which would combine elements of these. 
59. In one combination, the facility would intervene by all three means described, i.e. 
provide balancing support to individual centers (“gap filling”), match core-donor contributions 
so as to offset the disincentive to obtaining core-funding observed in regard of the current 
balancing facility, and support CGIAR approved research activities through up-front payments. 
Since the incentive from matching and the disincentive provided by access for gap-filling could 
cancel each other out if available for the same year, the matching component could be paid in 
relation to core contributions obtained in the previous rather than in the current year. The 
incentive effect would not be diminished. 
60. Such combined facility could allocate equal amounts for the three types of interventions, 
but other ratios could be considered. Thus one third of the World Bank contribution could be 
used for balancing center budgets, one third for up-front payments, and one thiid for matching. 
The application of penalty and sunset provisions discussed in para. 50 could be considered. The 
risk of some centers running up surpluses (observed in para. 55 above in case the whole World 
Bank contribution were used for matching), would be less of a concern; if they occurred they 
would be smaller. 
61. Under another option the facility would meet gap-filling needs and at the same time 
distribute funds up-front. Several variants are possible. It could fill gaps opening in the current 
year, or, under a hybrid variety (because it would include a matching element along with gap- 
filling), would use as benchmark the average core funding a center has received over a period 
of, say, three years, and compensate for the difference between that average and the current 
year’s requirements. This would even out shortfalls over a medium-term period and cushion 
sudden and steep reductions in core funding, but at the same time would provide an incentive 
(though not a very strong one) for a center to step up mobilization efforts in the year of funding 
contraction. Conversely, if funding has increased in the most recent year of the benchmark 
calculation, there would be little incentive to maintain a fund-raising drive, as any increment 
would result in the reduction of the payment from the facility. As a further variant, one could 
reserve a share of funds for up-front distribution, or to that end apply only the residual after all 
gap-filling needs have been met. However, unless the major share of funds is reserved for up- 
front distribution, any of these combinations is likely to discourage, or not sufficiently encourage 
core fund-raising efforts. In addition, their administration would be complex, and not meet the 
transparency requirement. 
62. It may be more practical to combine up-front distribution with gap-filling. Since gap- 
filling can discourage fund-raising efforts, the larger share of funds in the facility should be 
applied to up-front distribution. The small portion available for gap-filling could tide over 
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centers which, due to donor actions or exchange rate fluctuations, have come under unexpected 
funding pressures. The facility could limit such bridging assistance to a maximum of 20 or 25 
percent of a center’s requirements, and not make it available to a center more than once in, say, 
three years. A formula combining these elements would appear to respond best to the needs of 
the CGIAR in its current funding situation. 
63. The CGIAR Secretariat would continue to administer the facility on behalf of the World 
Bank. It would submit the proposed use of the funds available for balancing to the newly 
formed Finance Committee. This would allow donors to become aware of funding problems of 
individual centers and to suggest actions, for the current or a later budget year. 
V. Conclusions And Recommendations 
64. This paper has reviewed the working of the balancing facility currently provided in form 
of the World Bank contribution to the CGIAR. It has identified a number of disincentives that 
militate against fund raising efforts for core programs. 
65. In order to compensate for these disincentives, it is recommended to broaden the scope 
of interventions of the facility. In addition to meeting funding shortages of individual centers 
(gap-filling) and with it providing some stability against surges in exchange rates and inflation 
which to date has been its only form or intervention, one should consider other alternative forms 
of intervention such as the use of its funds to reward successful fund raising efforts of individual 
centers (matching), and/or to directly support agreed priority activities (“first donor” or up-front 
distribution). A combination of gap-filling and up-front distribution may be the most appropriate 






Criteria for Choosing an Allocation Formula 
Criterion # 1 
Does formula support “key 
principles” (collective 
agenda, autonomous center 
programming, individual 
donor allocations)? 
Criterion # 2 
Does formula shield centers 
from exogenous factors 
such as exchange rate 
fluctuations and purchasing 
power losses in host 
countrv 
Criterion # 3 Criterion # 4 
Does formula shield centers Does formula offer 
from System endogenous incentives for mobilizing 
factors, such as sudden funds additional to the 
changes in donor System (not only to the 
contributions? individual center) 
Criterion # 5 
Does formula give donors a 
sense of ownership and 
constructive partnership? 
Criterion # 6 




compensates for shortfalls in 
core funding by providing up 
to 25% of donor approved 
amounts for three years, 
followed by three annual 
decreases to 21%, 18% and 
15% 
Variation I - 
Fast Cutback: no grace 
period; penalty reduces 
support by 10% if shortfall 
exceeds IO% of approved 
core funding, and rises to 
maximum of 50% if shortfall 
exceeds 30% 
Variation II - 
Graduated Cutback: same as 
Variation I, but higher 
penalties apply to incremental 
shortfall only 
Multi-year gap-Iilltng 
would use as benchmark the 
average of previous three 
years’ funding level 
yes. it respects, and disbursement in tranches 
indirectly supports, permits adjustments 
collectively set priorities by 
making up for short-funding 
by other donors 
same as above 
same as above 
same as above, though on 
reduced scale for centers 
more heavily dependent on 
facility 
same as above 
yes no; provides disincentive to 
seek core funding above 75% 
of approved program. 
Declining support in years 4, 
5 and six corrects 
disincentive in small degree 
yes; though on reduced 
scale for centers more 
heavily dependent on 
facility 
no; provides disincentive to 
seek core funding above 90% 
of approved program. 
Progressive penalty corrects 
disincentive effect as 
shortfall exceeds 10% 
threshold 
yes no; same as above; because 
penalty less progressive, 
yes, as formula funds up to 
actual shortfall, though 
percentage of shortfall 
funded may differ 
substantially from one 
center to another (an 
acceptable consequence) 
no: such factors would only 
be compensated for in the 
following year, and then 
only to the extent of one- 
third of their impact. 
yes; would effectively 
protect against sudden 
funding shortfalls. 
none for centers with stable 
of increasing core 
contributions; and a negative 
incentive for centers with 
declining contributions, as 
long as a year of high 
funding still enters into the 
calculation of the average. 
no: donors mav see it as 
frustrating their own 
choices 
yes; because of impact of 
penalty, and without grace 
period, risk of frustrating 
donor designs is much 
reduced 
no; same as above, though 
less severe penalty 
no; 
requires pay-out in 
tranches as due 
amount not known 
until all donor 
contributions firmed 
up; available IMF 
data allow to 
compensate xchange 
rate fluctuations but 
not purchasing power 
losses in host country 
no; administration as 
complex, or even 
more so, than current 
formula. 
no; same as above 
no; while average for 
past three years 
available, final 
allocation can only be 
determined once 
current year’s 
shortfall is known 
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Criterion # I 
Does formula support “key 
principles” (collective 
agenda, autonomous center 
programming, individual 
donor allocations)? 
Criterion # 2 
Does formula shield centers 
from exogenous factors 
such as exchange rate 
fluctuations and purchasing 
power losses in host 
country 
Criterion # 3 
Does formula shield centers 
from System endogenous 
factors, such as sudden 
changes in donor 
contributions? 
Criterion # 4 
Does formula offer 
incentives for mobilizing 
funds additional to the 
System (not only to the 
individual center) 
Criterion # 5 
Does formula give donors a 
sense of ownership and 
constructive partnership? 
Criterion # 6 
Is formula simple and 
transparent? 
Matching 
against core contributions 
received in same year 
no; on the contrary, it 
further distorts the funding 
discrepancies resulting from 
donor discretion in 
allocating their funds 
no 
no; same as above no 
no no no: final allocation 
will have to await 




yes: one-year time lag 
unlikely to affect force of 
incentive 
no; but is incentive-neutral 
against core contributions 




no; but it does not interfere 
with their choices and 
preferences 
yes; in contrast to a gap- 
filling formula, it directly 




Matching + gap-filling 
matching would be effected 
against previous year’s core 
contributions; a fixed share 
would be reserved for gap- 
tilling 
Up-front distribution and 
gap-filling 
would set aside fixed shares 
for both purposes. 
no; system supporting effect 
of gap-filling offset by 
matching 
yes; but reduced as only 
part of facility available for 
gap-filling 
yes, but reduced as only 
part of facility available for 
gap-filling 
yes; as matching applies 
against prior year’s 
contributions, its fund-raising 
incentive will not be offset 
by gap-tilling disincentive 
no; current year’s 
donor commitments to 
be firmed up before 
gap-tilling allocation 
can be made 
yes; would provide direct 
and indirect support 
yes; but reduced as only 
part of facility available for 
gap-filling 
yes, but reduced as only 
part of facility available for 
gap-filling 
no; gap-filling component 
will provide disincentive 
no; current year’s 
donor commitments to 
be firmed up before 
gap-filling allocation 
can be made 
Three-way combination 
(would combine elements of 
gap-filling, matching against 
prior year and up-front 
distribution in shares of one 
third each; other shares are 
possible) 
yes; through up-front 
distribution and gap-tilling 
yes; through gap-filling yes; through up-front 
distribution and gap-filling 
yes; through matching 
component 
up-front distribution and 
matching will not interfere 
with donor preferences 
yes for up-front 
distribution and 
matching: no for gap- 
filling as current 
year’s donor 
commitments to be 
awaited before gap- 




Example of a Fast-Cutback Formula 
If the shortfall in there will be a penalty of 
approved core funding 
amounts to 
< 10% no penalty (balancing facility provides 100% of shortfall) 
lo-15% 10% penalty (balancing facility provides 90% of shortfall) 
15-20% 20% penalty (balancing facility provides 80 % of shortfall) 
20-25 % 30% penalty (balancing facility provides 70% of shortfall) 
25-30% 40% penalty (balancing facility provides 60% of shortfall) 
> 30% 50% penalty (balancing facility provides 50% of shortfall) 
Comparison of Fast-Cutback and Graduated Cutback Formulas 
Assume a shortfall of $6.5 million on a $20 million approved core program. The balancing 
facility would contribute under the 
Fast-Cutback Formula Graduated Cutback Formula 
(higher penalty applies to increment only) 




maximum penalty of 50% 




100% of $2.0 million $2.0 million 
90% of $1.0 million $0.9 million 
80% of $1.0 million $0.8 million 
70% of $1.0 million $0.7 million 
60% of $1.0 million $0.6 million 
50% of $0.5 million $0.25 million 
$5.25 million 
